

From: largeassociates <largeassociates@gmail.com>
Subject: 233 le Creusot Forge
Date: 2 February 2017 at 16:44:31 GMT
To: ONRenquiries@hse.gsi.gov.uk
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I refer to the visit by the Office for Nuclear Regulation personnel to the le Creusot Forge from 28 November to 2 December, 2016. With respect to this visit, and relating to heavy forged high integrity components (HIC - i.e. primary pressure boundary) manufactured at le Creusot to date for Sizewell B and for existing and future Hinkley Point C NPPs, please provide the following:-

1) a full and unredacted copy of the ONR's account of its le Creusot visit or, if this is not currently available, the date at which it is the intention of the ONR to publish an account of its findings in relation to HIC equipment that has entered or was and/or is intended to enter service in UK NPPs (e.g past Sizewell B components and the upper and lower heads manufactured in advance of HPC, whether these were destroyed by testing or not); and

relating to the le Creusot Forge manufacturing and inspect processes:-

2) the cause(s) of the past non-detection of irregularities at le Creusot, particularly for the known unacceptable levels of heterogeneity and excess carbon segregates in the advance order HPC reactor pressure vessel (RPV) heads;

3) the corrective actions that ONR requires of le Creusot Forge (via the HPC licensee/operator EDF Energy) to i) detect such irregularities of item 2) above and how these are to be ii) identified and iii) reported to ONR by le Creusot;

4) with regard to the identification of all possible contributory causes of irregularities, defects, etc in the UK destined HICs, is the ONR satisfied that the le Creusot commissioned Lloyd's Register Apave Review identified ALL causes, and corrective and preventative actions;

5) has the ONR received a risk analysis undertaken by le Creusot on the

quality of produced parts (both Sizewell B and HPC), including account of all organisational changes, quality system and surveillance method that have been implemented and that could have possibly influenced the production quality of the HICs;

6) is the ONR in possession of le Creusot inspection reports that include detailed specifications, codes, standards, etc against which inspections were undertaken by le Creusot personnel for specific component parts;

7) is the ONR satisfied that at le Creusot there are sufficient measures for fraud detection and, if so, the date(s) from which these measures have been in place and effective;

8) relating to the HPC RPV upper and bottom heads, does ONR have full confidence in the Pellini test records and the reported analysed values of RTndt (nil-ductility transition temperature); and

9) with respect to ONR's acceptance of manufacturing, inspection and quality standards of HIC equipment destined forth UK nuclear fuel cycle chain, is or will the ONR be dependent upon any other state nuclear safety regulatory authority such as *Autorité de surety nucléaire*, particularly for the nuclear safety regulation and licensing of the HPSC NPP?

Please note that this request is made under the *Environmental Information Regulations 2004*, specifically S5 (2) for which the date of this request should be taken as 2 February 2017 - in your response it would be helpful if you could follow the order of my itemisation above when responding.

John Large

