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Large & Associates
Consulting Engineers Reports, Analysis and Papers Archive |
Recent Reports - Papers |
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| Nogent Unit 1 - Control Rod Cluster Jamming | |||||||||
| On Wednesday 22 August EDF announced that pressurised water reactor (PWR) Nogent Unit 1 (1,310MWe P’4 Series – Nogent-sur-Seine) had shut down due to a ‘blocked’ control rod in the main fuel core – the NPP is to remain shut down until 16 September 2018 whilst further investigations are undertaken. | This Briefing Note identifies and examines the possibilities that Nogent 1 may have to remain off line longer than its present extended outage of 16 September 2018. | ||||||||
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| Downturn in Performance of French NPP during 2018 Heat Wave and Prolonged Drought | |||||||||
| Nuclear power plants (NPPs), like most other electricity generating power stations, rely upon a local heat sink to dissipate a considerable amount of the total heat generated in the steamside cycle. Typically, running on a thermodynamic process known as the Carnot cycle, an electricity generating plant will need to dissipate about two-thirds of the total heat generated to the local environment, usually via a river, lake or sea connection, commonly referred to as the ultimate heat sink (UHS). | |||||||||
| In the Carnot cycle the steam leaving the final stage of the low pressure turbine is exhausted into large volume, low vacuum vessel (the separate condenser) where it condenses to the incompressible liquid phase to be pumped back up to the steam generator pressure. | |||||||||
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| By converting the exhaust steam to its liquid phase the condenser maximises the recovery of the cycle ‘back-end’ heat and enables the water to be pumped back to the steam generators at minimum pumping (compressibility) losses.
This Briefing Note reveals the weaknesses in certain French NPPs that result in loss of availability during summer months. |
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| Advanced Concrete Carbonation Believed to be Extant at Doel 3 | |||||||||
This assessment examines the possibilities and risks associated with the alleged extensive carbonation degradation of a reinforced concrete framed structure housing a back-up facility recently discovered at the Doel 3 nuclear power plant - the Belgium safety regulator Federaal Agentschap voor Nucleaire Controle (FANC) will not agree a specific restart date until this outstanding concrete degradation issue has been resolved.
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| Effectiveness of French Nuclear Power Plants Grid-Balancing and Frequency Modulation Roles Thrown into Doubt | |||||||||
This Briefing Note assesses the possible outcomes of recent changes introduced by Électricité de France (EDF) that commits certain of the earlier 900MWe series nuclear power plants to the frequency regulation and load-following power modulation roles. The analysis includes account of the growing renewable, particularly wind and solar photovoltaic, inputs into and proportion of the base-load, of which the lion's share is presently held by the nuclear generating sector. |
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| KEPCO Investigation into Kobe Steel 'Improper Conduct' over Certification of Materials and Components Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Challenged | |||||||||
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In early October 2017 Kobe Steel acknowledged quality control problems with materials and processed metal products that had entered the component supply chains of various Japanese industries (motor vehicle, aviation, railway and nuclear power) over at least the last decade. |
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| Tricastin NPP Enforced Shutdown due to Embankment Liquefaction Risk | |||||||||
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The French nuclear safety regulator Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) has ordered the immediate shutdown of the 4 Tricastin 900MWe nuclear power plants because of uncertainties about the earthquake triggered liquefaction risk of the embankment of the Donzère-Mondragon canalised section of the Rhône. The immediately adjacent AREVA fuel enrichment site is also affected with the requirement that the site is secured, particularly the uranium hexafluoride casks parked around the site. The Tricastin EDF nuclear plants are at 6m below the canal level and there is a high dependence on the canal for both reactor and spent fuel cooling. The AREVA Georges Besse II uranium enrichment is also likely to shut down until the embankment remedial works have been completed. |
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| Latest Whitewash on Whitewash at Bugey 5 NPP Containment Leaktightness | |||||||||
Just 2 months following the approval and implementation of the EDF repair scheme, at Bugey 5 NPP the repaired sealing of the inner steel liner is failing. Presently, to maintain an acceptable but undisclosed level of leaktightness it is necessary for operators to enter the containment whilst the nuclear plant is in operation. To maintain the leak rate the whitewash slurry has to be topped up over the 110m long peripheral slot, even so it is not clear if the present leak rate Fe is compliant with the ASN reuirement of <0.3% of the containment gas mass per day. |
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| ASN Grants EDF CCWS Dispensation at Paluel 3 and Extends Decennial Outage | |||||||||
The French nuclear safety regulator Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) has granted a dispensation to EDF on how it demonstrates the fouling of the CCWS and SEC heat recovery exchangers at the Paluel 3 1300MWe NPP - Dripping Tap by Kurt Stubbing
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Drum Screens at Flamanville Units 1 and 2 Readied for Replacement
The French nuclear safety regulator Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) has permitted EDF to replace two drum screens at the Flamanville Unit 1 and 2 NPPs - see photograph of similar drum screen pit at Flammanville 3. Although ASN hints that it is serious with “que cette modification constitue une modification notable des modalités d’exploitation” it provides no further details of the problem.
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Gravelines 5 NPP - Seismic Non-Compliance In June 2017 the French nuclear safety regulator Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) raised the issue of the seismic qualification and non-compliance of the heat sink feed (SEC) to the component cooling system (RRI). Its independent advisor IRSN reviewed the proposals of the nuclear power plant operator, Électricité de France (EDF), to remedy the situation.
This Assessment critically reviews the IRSN analysis and recommendations that the Gravelines 5 (and its sister plant Gravelines 6) be permitted to operate for at least a further 5 months with the risk that its post-SCRAM heat recovery systems might be ineffective in a loss of offsite power (LOOP) situation |
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Civaux I Containment Leaktightness in Doubt Recent reports of a dramatic increase in the leak rate through the inner concrete shell of the reactor containment raises doubts about the effectiveness of the Double-Walled sealing system used in the 1300MWe and 1450MWe French nuclear power plants.
This Assessment examines the contributory factors that have led to this loss of leaktightness at Civaux I and, particularly, if the substantial works necessary to maintain the 1.5% per day leak rate can be practicably completed. The validity of the 0.53MPa air inflation test at ambient temperature and humidity as an equivalent and representative marker to the design-basis LOCA in-containment environment is challenged. |
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ASN Authorisation of 1300MWe NPP Steam Generator Tube Plugging Limit In June 2016 the French nuclear power plant (NPP) operator, Électricité de France (EDF), applied to the nuclear safety regulator Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) for an upward revision in the total number of individual tubes of steam generators (SG) of the 1300MWe series NPPs that could removed from service by plugging. In February 2017, ASN reauthorized the upper limit of plugging be raised from the previously maximum limit of 10% to 18%, this being the second reauthorisation of the plugging limit raised from 5% to 10% in 2013. In addition to allowing a greater number of SG tubes to be plugged, ASN also agreed in May 2017 to permit EDF to repair certain defective tubes by a technique known as sleeving.
This Review analyses the reasoning underpinning this unusually high tube plugging limit and considers the consequences, particularly relating to any performance changes during and in the aftermath of small and large break LOCAs. |
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Non-Compliance of Seismic Design Basis - Emergency Diesel Generator Sets at EDF 1300MWe Nuclear Power Plants The IRSN publication (Note d’information ‘Non-tenue au séisme des groupes électrogènes de secours à moteur Diesel des réacteurs nucléaires du palier 1300 MWe’ 21 June 2017) refers specifically to the existing EDG installations at the 1300MWe NPPs as being non-compliant in terms of seismic qualification of the mounting and associated details of the EDG water coolant surge tanks – this is considered to be a reportable incident of the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) 2.
This independent LargeAssociates assessment of the seismic shortfalls at the 20 1300MWe NPPs places the situation in the context of the slippage in the ASN directed programme of achieving a hardened safety core for the P4 and P'4 and other French NPPs. |
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Carbon Anomaly Threat to Japanese Nuclear Equipment Supply Chain
This work follows on the French nuclear debacle of flawed JCFC and, possibly, JSW steam generator Class 1 components entering the French Nuclear Equipment Supply Chain that has directly resulted in 12 French nuclear power plants being shut down for further investigation.
The premise is that, first, since it is irrefutable that macrosegregated, excess carbon components were wholly manufactured in the JCFC Japanese works and, second, since these manifestly flawed parts were somehow about to leave the JCFC works without detection, the only remaining safeguard to stop similarly flawed components entering the Japanese supply chain would have been the then (1990 to 2000) much discredited Japanese nuclear safety regulator NISA - of course, in France this final barrier, ASN, failed to safeguard the French nuclear power plants. |
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Creusot Forge - Carbon Anomaly, Irregularities and CFSI Components Forged components of the Flamanville 3 NPP reactor pressure vessel were first manufactured in 2005-06. These end caps or heads were then welded into the RPV assemblage, the whole machined into the finished RPV that was finally installed into the reactor pit in the primary containment dome and, finally connected to the other components of the primary coolant loop. Then in 2014 AREVA first informed the nuclear safety regulator ASN that weaknesses in the material toughness of the cap components had been discovered.
This LargeAssociates comprehensive review explores the developing situation relating to the Flamanville 3 NPP project and considers the nuclear safety implications for certain operational NPPs in France that are also afflicted with much the same safety related defects. |
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Emergency Planning |
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AWE off-site emergency accident plans awry
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| Nuclear Powered Submarine Berth at Southampton - REPPIR
Docking of nuclear powered submarines Tireless and Astute nearby Southampton cruise liner terminal raises concerns but Council drives through permissions - Astute docking fatal shooting in the sub control room - REPPIR off-site countermeasure action zones found to be inadequate and under-resourced. LargeAssociates 1st and 2ndt Assessments of both On- and Off-site REPPIR emergency plan reveals inadequacies in reporting for Reports for the Solent Coalition Against Nuclear Ships |
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Glossary for the Layman's Guide to AWE Off-Site Emergency Planning
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Military-Industrial Complex
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Salvage of K141 Kursk
 Throughout the world-first successful salvage operations recovering a sunken nuclear powered submarine, LargeAssociates oversaw all radiological aspects relating to the two OK 650 nuclear reactors and nuclear warheads carried on board. |
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Review of the USSR U-Pu Capsule
 The claim is that these capsules originated from former Soviet Union military activities during the Afghanistan War. It is also claimed that many such capsules remain in and about Afghanistan and outer regions of Pakistan, with numbers ranging from many thousands of capsules to as few as a dozen or so to be found at a few separate localities. |
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Risks and Hazards arising from the Transportation of Nuclear Weapons  |
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Sinking of the Soviet Nuclear Powered Submarine Hulk K159 |
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NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF GIBRALTAR REPORT ON THE SAFETY OF HMS TIRELESS WHILST UNDER REPAIR AT GIBRALTAR 
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THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND JAPAN) 
Since completion of this Review in 2005 North Korea has conducted a number of underground nuclear weapons tests, commencing in 2006 with a single detonation followed by similar relatively small-yield atomic (fission) devices in 2009, 2013 and two tests in 2016. Parallel with its nuclear weapons development programme, North Korea has been active in ballistic missile development. |
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Forensic Assessments of the Nuclear Propulsion Plants of HMS Tirelss and NFS Kursk 
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| Radiological Calamity at Tuwaitha Iraq
Radiological Contamination at Saddam's Tuwaitha nuclear material plant in the wake of the Iraq invasion. |
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Development of nuclear weapon materials in Iran  |
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Nuclear Security
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Vulnerability of Nuclear Plants and Facilities to the Terrorist Threat It is now established that in the recent past nuclear plants have been targeted by terrorists to create havoc in the public domain - this published paper considers the vulnerability of such plants to acts of terrorism. |
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Vulnerability of BNF Sellafield to Terrorist Attack 
A terrorist cell charged with attacking Sellafield could readily obtain sufficient information from publicly available documents to identify highly hazardous and vulnerable targets on the Sellafield site for which there exists little defence in depth. |
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Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plants to Drone Attack 
Over the period from 14 September 2014 to 16 November a total of 31 overflights by unmanned aerial vehicles - drones - had taken place at 19 French nuclear installations, 14 of which were nuclear power plant (NPP) sites. The motivation for and purpose of the drone flights remain a mystery. The overflights are unauthorised and blatantly flout the restriction orders for airspace above and around NPPs and, of course, there are very serious nuclear safety and security implications. In view of the mounting public concern EdF, along with the national security and nuclear safety authorities, has not been able to anticipate, detect and deter the drone flights, nor identify and restrain the human perpetrators from continuing with this activity. |
Snippets |
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 Putin's Probing Submarines Puts the Willies Up Williamson  9 September 2018
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 Hunterston B Not At All What it is Cracked Up to Be  7 May 2018
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 Secrets of MoD Secret Reports  17 July 2018
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 Prime Minister Says Don't Worry  6 June 2018
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 Kobe's Nuclear Steel Tentacles  "In September 2015, the release of an independent evaluation conducted by Large and Associates – a UK-based engineering firm – really blew the doors open."
30 October 2017 |
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MoD Review Panel Not Available to Comment on its Redacted report into Trident Replacement  "continuing onslaught of willy-nilly cutbacks"
20 November 2017 |
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 The Great British Black-Out - MoD suddenly censors all Trident safety reports  "By redacting and excluding anything nuclear, these recent reports reveal the MoD’s contempt and utter disregard for public concerns about nuclear safety,"
12 November 2017 |
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 The Return of the Drones  Nos centrales nucléaires sont terriblement vulnérables : la preuve17
12 October 2017 |
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 le Creusot Forge "Well he would say that, Wouldn't He!  17 August 2017
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 EDF Asks For and Gets a French Letter  16 August 2017
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 A Dirty Weekend in Torbay  1 June 2017
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 Pop Gun Diplomacy  17 March 2017
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 Brexatom just Plain Bonkers  24 February 2017
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Flamanville Flip-Flops Out 1 Week Repair Extends to 6 Weeks  21 February 2017 |
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 RN Trafalgar SSN Subs in the Dock 
12 February 2017 |
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Periodic Safety Reviews Delayed for Hinkley Point B and Hunterston B  EdF Energy
FOI Request 1 February 2017
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BrExit Exits Euratom  27 January 2017 |
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 Things that Bump in the Depths
25 January 2017
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Another Chip off the Old Block - is Nuclear Safety at Hunterston at all what it is cracked up to be?  |
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9 December 2016 |
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Waste Not - Want Not  10 November 2016 |
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 Old Bangers and UK's AGR Nuclear Power Plants 1 November 2016
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 Large Associates Report 'really blew the doors open'  1 November 2016
We wouldn't put it quite like that, more "A Breath of Fresh Air'
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Scotland Cracks Up  1 November 2016
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 Damp Squib for the Stacks of Duncansby  31 October 2016
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All Cracking Up at Hinkley and Hunterston  31 October 2016
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ONR Jabberwocky 26 October 2016 |
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 Fancy a Chinese Takeway  12 October 2016
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 AKW Fessenheim vor Stilllegung  4 October 2016 |
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INFO OBS. 55% des réacteurs nucléaires français seraient défectueux'  29 September 2016
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Nuke Flight needed Armed Cop Convoy  or the Scots language is alive and well
18 September 2016 |
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Sizewell B and 27 other EDF nuclear plants 'at risk of catastrophic failure'  29 September 2016
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ACCUSÉ LEVEZ-VOUS
 29 September 2018
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 European Commission NPP Stress Testing |
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Taking the lid off Sellafield's Years of neglect and bungling  3 September 2016
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Southern California Edison Shuts Down both San Onofre NPPs  11 June 2013 |
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Onderzoek kerncentrale Borssele na waarschuwing België  19 February 2015 |
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Ageing NPPs - In A Safe Pair of Hands  14 April 2015 |
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John Large Opines on Sea Dumping  14 April 2015 |
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Terrorist Threat to UK NPPs 25 March 2016 |
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Fraffe Nucléaire Française 2 June 2016 |
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Green Entropy  16 April 2016 |
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Chernobyl After Effects  30 April 2016 |
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Whitewash at Whitehall  17 January 2003 |
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Terror Arrests at BNFL 28 December 2015 |
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Sakurajima Tephra Confronts Sendai NPPs 17 August 2015 |
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Quake Sparks Nuclear Crisis at Fukushima NPPs  15 March 2011 |
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English Beekeeper Teaches the French a Thing or Two about Drones  21 December 2014 |
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Fukushima Daiichi 17 September 2012 |
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Face from the Past  ITN News
21 December 1982 |
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Radioactive Honey gives off a Buzz near Dounreay  2 November 2015  |
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Doubts Expressed about the Great Chinese Nuclear Takeaway   17October 2013 |
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  15 March 2011
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Carry on at CoRWM
 29 Match 2005 |
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UK's nuclear regulator warns of rising terror threat to nuclear industry
 25 March 2016 |
Nuclear Design-Resilience |
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Vulnerability of French NPPs to Accidental Aircraft Crash Analysis and evaluation of French NPP vulnerability to direct crash of a civil airliner on the nuclear island and other safety crucial parts of the plant. |
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San Onofre Replacement Steam Generator Root Cause Analysis - Summary   This Summary combines two recent assessments undertaken by Large & Associates on the replacement steam generator problems and proposals to restart at least one of the two nuclear power plants at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The first assessment considers the proposals of the plant operator and licensee, Southern California Edison to restart Unit 2, operating the plant at 70% of its thermal rated power. The second assessment considers whether the NRC's Confirmatory Action Letter was anther form of de facto license amendment. |
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PEER REVIEW OF THE AMEC-NNC REPORT ROLE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE LOW CARBON ECONOMY 
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Degradation of AGR Graphite Moderator Cores
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THORP Feed Clarification Cell Leak - Corroded Dissolver Pipework  Following discrepancies in the inventory and nuclear material balance controls at the front end of the irradiated fuel thermal oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) at Sellafield, on 20 April 2005 a remotely operated camera revealed a significant quantity of highly radioactive liquor in the sump of Cell 220. In total and over several months previously, approximately 84m3 of liquor, in the form of a nitric acid solution of fuel and fission products, had built-up in the sump, leaking from a feed pipe connection to one of two accountancy vessels located in the cell. |
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Y BROSES HENEIDDIO A’I DYLANWAD AR DDIOGELWCH A PHERFFORMIAD WYLFA  Mae’r Adolygiad hwn yn ystyried sut y gellid disgwyl i’r broses heneiddio effeithio ar berfformiad a diogelwch yr orsaf ynni niwclear yn Wylfa. |
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Regulatory Control
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Leibstadt NPP in-core Dry-Out extends enforced outage At Leibstadt, the planned 2 August 2016 partial refuelling outage was originally scheduled to end on 27 August, was first extended by a further 8 weeks until 29 October, but is now projected to last through to February 2017.
The reason for this extended outage is damage to the nuclear fuel pin cladding, now acknowledged to be due to an in-core phenomenon referred to as ‘dryout’ dating back to the 2012-2013 fuel core cycle. It is now reported that similar levels of fuel pin surface scarring arose in subsequent fuel core cycles. For the 2015-16 fuel cycle Axpo put in place specific measures to eliminate what it believed to be the root cause triggering dryout but examination of the 2015-16 fuel core fuel removed in mid-August revealed the problem persisting with similar area of fuel pin dryout surface scarring developing during the fuel cycle. In other words, the root cause solution implemented by Axpo did not address and rectify the dryout phenomenon. In order for Leibstadt NPP to be allowed to start up again, ENSI has stated (20 December 2016) that “. . .the fuel core loading and reactor operation must be such as to exclude dryout during normal operation, in the event of operational malfunctions and in accident categories 1 and 2 of the design basis accidents”. Preparations towards satisfying this ENSI requirement seems to have been the reason why a normally 3 to 4 week refuelling outage of 2016 has now been extended indefinitely until at least February 2017 (24 weeks+). |
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Carbon Anomaly Spreads to the World's Oldest Operating Nuclear Power Plant at Beznau |
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EPR GDA incomplete but design given go-ahead LargeAssociates Final Review identifies shortfalls LargeAssociates 1st , 2nd Interim and Final Reviews not challenged by Office for Nuclear Regulation's Response Letter - see also later LargeAssociates reporting on Carbon Anomaly at Flamanville 3 RPV. |
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Olkiluoto 3 Finland - STUK Regulatory Assessment  The substantive findings of this review relate inadequacies and incompleteness of the regulatory assessment at the Construction Licensing stage; if the speed at which STUK completed its assessment facilitated proper examination and testing of the nuclear safety case of this world-first installation of the Generation III EPR nuclear power plant; the failure to publish a full assessment of the plant’s resistance to commercial aircraft crash (previously promised to be an essential nuclear safety prerequisite) and, similarly, the lack of demonstration in any aspect whatsoever that the plant will be sufficiently robust against all reasonably foreseeable terrorist action; and failure to give meaningful account to the radioactive waste management and eventual decommissioning of the plant and its nuclear island at some future time. |
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Sizewell A Irradiated Fuel Pond Drain Down  This is a review of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate’s decision not to prosecute Magnox Electric Ltd over its involvement in the Sizewell A radioactive discharge incident of 7 January 2007. The radioactive release arose as a direct consequence of a breach in the pipework of the spent fuel pond water recirculation system resulting in uncontrolled spillage of 40,000 gallons (180m3) of (radio)active water over a period of about 45 minutes. About one-quarter of this spillage discharged completely untreated to the marine environment via the Sizewell A site storm drainage system. |
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United States NRC News
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Lost WANO 2000 Assessment for Laguna Verdi NPP Mexico Confidential World Association of Nuclear Operators inspection report hides significant shortfalls at Laguna Verdi in 2000. |
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ONR's TiP on Aircraft Crash NOT to study Aircraft Crash Terms of Reference for ONR's aircraft crash TAP will not include for NPP containment damage severity, release inventory and radiological consequences of potential release scenarios |
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Legal - Public Inquiries
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Operational Nuclear Safety of the Ōma Nuclear Power Plant - Legal Action Underway by the City of Hakodate The Ōma NPP, located in Aomori, Japan was first planned to commence commercial operation in or about 2008 but that this was subsequently delayed to enable design amendments in account of the national review of Japanese seismic standards. Then, following the catastrophic failure of the three operating BWR units at Fukushima Daiichi during the earthquake and associated tsunami of March 2011, further construction at Ōma was again suspended until around October 2012.
Further delays and uncertainties arose because of the upheaval to the Japanese nuclear safety regulatory framework following Fukushima Daiichi events of 2011 and, thereafter, the progressive introduction of the newly formed (September 2012) Nuclear Regulation Authority’s (NRA) Draft New Safety Standards for Nuclear Power Stations (1) and, separately, the Outline New Regulatory Requirements for the Design Basis (2), Severe Accident Measures (3), and Earthquakes and Tsunamis (4) respectively, all introduced in outline or draft form in April 2013. The latest position with the construction programme at Ōma is that ‘safety upgrades’ to suit the NRA’s New Safety and Regulatory Standards and Requirements (items 1, 2, 3 and 4 of paragraph 5) are not planned to commence until 2018 for completion in or about 2023. This project, comprising a number of Expert Evidence Statements to the Court, argues that it is not practical to revise the pre-Fukushima Daiichi design of the Ōma NPP because of its advanced stage of construction and so could never satisfy the New Regulatory Requirements brought about by the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. It is in support of the legal action taken by the City of Hakodate to prevent resumption of construction and the eventual commercial operation of the Ōma NPP in or around 2023. |
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An Taisce challenges DECC Secretary of State over Hinkley Point C decision LargeAssociates Witness Statement features in An Taisce (National Trust of Ireland) challenge to DECC Secretary of State's decision not to consult with the Republic of Ireland over Hinkley Point C consultation. |
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Ms X's Clash with a Nuclear Weapons Carrier in the Dead of the Night
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Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Extension Review of the physical stability and dispersion characteristics, etc., of unirradiated Mixed Oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel involved in Maritime Incidents and Accidents. |
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San Onofre Mitsubishi |
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| This analysis links the Mitsubishi action items determined at design meetings for the replacement steam generators meetings to progress of the design and knowledge of Edison and Mitsubishi of the problems as these developed. | ||||
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Adequacy of the Proposed Amendment to the Third Party Liability Finance Arrangements Covering Nuclear Damages from Swiss Nuclear Plants At present, all nuclear operators must take out private insurance cover with a Swiss insurer of at least CHF 500 million for each NPP with an additional CHF 50 million for procedural and interest costs as these might arise. Separately, the operators also have to pay into a Nuclear Damage Fund that is administered by the Federal Office of Energy with the objective that this fund will be sufficient to make up any liability shortfall of the private insurance cover up to a total of CHF 1,000 million to meet all third party claims for any single radiation incident. The Swiss federal government considers these liability cover arrangements to be sufficiently robust that it has not been necessary for Switzerland to ratify the international nuclear liability treaties (notably the Paris-Brussels Convention and Revision Protocols) to which it is signatory. |
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Information Commissioner's Office finds against ONR on EIR Claims Information Commissioner's Office finds against ONR on EIR Claims for journalist Rob Edwards Relating to aircraft crash on a NPP, the ICO Decision Notice FER0377581 concluded that although the ONR was correct in withholding the requested information, the time taken do so, over 13 months compared to the statutory period of 20 working days, was excessive.  |
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IAEA Mission to Fukushima Daiichi fails to identify cause of 2011 catastrophe 
During the last week of May 2011 the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) sent a team of about 20 nuclear experts to Japan to investigate the ongoing nuclear situation a Fukushima, publishing |
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Accidents and Incidents
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Chernobyl 20 Years On  |
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Chernbyl - A nucleaor catastrophe 20 years on - Review of the Radiological Situation in 2006. |
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Accidental Atmospheric Release Analysis for Flamanville and Other French NPPs Using European Community Standard modelling software (COSYMA), this assessment compares the proposed Flamanville EPR to the radiological consequences of a severe radioactive release arising from a containment-bypass or containment failure at each of a number of existing NPPs in France, including Tricastin, Nogent-sur-Seine and Fessenheim. Because France has in place a programme to utilise reactor grade plutonium fuel (MOX) in certain of its existing NPPs and specifically in the EPR development at Flamanville, the impact of a radioactive release of MOX is examined in comparison with a low enriched uranium (LEU) fuelled NPP. The assessment includes account of the type of nuclear fuel, both LEU and MOX that is currently in use in French NPPs, and it projects the higher radiological consequences should the Generation III European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) proposed at Flamanville be subject to a severely damaging incident |
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La Vulnérabilite des Centrales Nucléaires Françaises aux Chutes d'Avion |
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TEPCO Plan to Flood Primary Containment at Fukushima Daiichi
 EPCO plans to flood Unit 1 containment considered unwise. |
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THULE-2003 - Investigation of the Plutonium Contamination  |
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Transportation |
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 Hazards and risks accompanying the transportation of new MOX fuel from Sellafield to Beznau NPP - dispersion analysis considers the greater release fraction of MOX when subject to intense heat possible in a rail tunnel and/or ship fire. |
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HEU Irradiated Fuel Transport from Australia to COGEMA France  Hazards and risks accompanying the transportation of new MOX fuel from Sellafield to Beznau NPP - dispersion analysis considers the greater release fraction of MOX when subject to intense heat possible in a rail tunnel and/or ship fire. |
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HEU Irradiated Fuel Transport by Rail in the United Kingdom - Risks and Hazards  This Review identifies potential accidents and malevolent acts that could severely damage a spent fuel transportation flask, thereby enabling the release of radioactivity, in the form of particles and aerosols, and the corresponding health risk imposed on unprotected members of public. Because the rail routes take the spent fuel trains through major urban conurbations (London, Bristol, etc) many thousands of population could be subject to radiation exposure in the aftermath of such an event. |
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Swedish Irradiated Fuel CLAB Strategy Sweden’s irradiated fuel management strategy involves moving spent fuel from each of the nuclear power stations to a central fuel storage facility (CLAB). Spent fuel will remain at CLAB until it can be transferred to a deep disposal repository (SFL) some time after year 2008. All fuel movements from the NPPs to CLAB, except for the Oskarshamn reactors nearby, are by the specially adapted ship M/S Sigyn using internationally approved transportation flasks. |
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Export of Uranium Hexafluoride Tailings and Spent Containers This analysis considers the hidden international exchange of empty but highly contaminated UF6 containers from the Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant in the United States, where the export is little more than a ruse to ship radioactive waste abroad, to the Russian Federation Siberian radioa-chemical plant at which, or so it is claimed, the residue |
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Risk and Hazards of the Road Transport of Plutonium Dioxide Powder Across France
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